[Kenny Cole]

Peter,

"Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we find that there was substantial evidence reasonably tending to support the jury's verdict. Mr. Musgrove had extensive experience in the travel business and a foundation was properly laid for his testimony relating to the value of Rainbow's good will. Indeed, appellants did not object to Mr. Musgrove's testimony and conceded that he was qualified to express an opinion on the issue of good will. Appellants argue nonetheless that the amount of damages to good will was so uncertain as to be speculative. The rule in Oklahoma, however, is that the prohibition against recovery of damages because the loss is uncertain or too speculative in nature applies to the fact of damages, not to the amount. Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 92 (Okla.1976). “Where it is made to appear that some loss has been suffered, it is proper to let the jury determine what the loss is from the best evidence the nature of the case admits.” Hardesty v. Andro Corporation–Webster Division, 555 P.2d 1030 (Okla.1976). Given the nature of good will, which is an intangible asset dependant upon a business' reputation, it was proper for the district court in this case to submit the question of damages to good will to the jury. See Westric Battery Co. v. Standard Electric Co., Inc., 522 F.2d 986, 987 n. 2 (10th Cir.1975) (“The amount cannot and hence need not be proven with absolute certainty.”). See also Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943, 96 S.Ct. 1412, 47 L.Ed.2d 349 (“The wrongdoer may not complain of inexactness where his actions preclude precise computation to the extent of the injury.”)."

Rainbow Travel Serv., Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 896 F.2d 1233, 1239–40 (10th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).