After reading it, my main problem with this ruling is that it dodges around the logical problems instead of addressing them.
Some of what the professors are teaching and specifically listed is clearly not banned by this law at all, and some of it is (the parts that openly racist, just racism directed against the correct race). That a teacher feels a need to self-censor their racism (38) I have a difficult time finding much empathy with. Just as if a teacher was preaching white supremacy to their class, I would expect them to face repercussion and be fired (as they 100% would be), I find it difficult to understand why it's exact reverse is somehow good. The court certainly doesn't want to ever touch on allowing this kind of speech in universities from whites with the wrong view.
The primary argument against this in the text is the first amendment concerns, which is also my problem with the law. However, the big problem is that this law isn't special. If it is in violation of the first amendment by regulating what can and cannot be taught in the classroom (and I think a good argument is made here and via common sense that it is), pretty much every education law in the nation needs to be thrown out too for violation of the same. This is a niche position of an element of the libertarian right, and so of course it cannot be endorsed, only applied to this specific law, and no others that regulate classroom instruction, materials, and subject. That's my big problem here. The outrage over this is not "the state should not censor at all, a teacher should be able to say anything they want no matter how reprehensible as the 1st allows", it's outrage that they can't teach racism in general, to any race. If the bill banned teaching only white supremacy, it would be unanimous. It's only because it bans teaching racism against ANY race that there is a public outcry and anger. None of this addressed, it goes out of it's way to try and not explain how this law and this law alone is a violation of the first; it only argues that this law violates the first, which it very well may.
It does acknowledge that public education is "committed to the control of state and local authorities", which it then seeks to undermine as much as possible because while that outcome is generally desired, it is bad in this one instance. It's use of Bishop is pretty weak, and I don't see that case having much bearing here. On the other side, I found the state's argument of Title IX is also very weak and uncompelling.
Page 102 states there is not a savings clause in the IFA bill, unlike the anti-semitism statute. This is plainly false, and other parts of this court ruling (including just 9 pages later) acknowledge the savings clause. Unless I'm misreading it, this is patently absurd. 79-83 are this clause, very, very explicitly. There are a number of points where this ruling seems to not be responding to the law at all, but political opinion. The ruling tries not to endorse the right of a teacher to say whatever they want, by effectively requiring the university itself to agree with it (and thus, protecting far left ideology that universities tend to lean too without having to protect other viewpoints) (105). The ruling attacks the vagueness with some sarcasm, though it seems to have difficulty stipulating which words are problematic, as terms like critical race theory are not present and the language is quite direct. It ends up focusing on the savings clause, that just a few pages ago it insisted didn't exist, that permits "discussion" if "given in an objective matter without endorsement". Fact vs. advocacy I have a hard time seeing a problem separating. Again, if this is the standard, we need to throw out the vast majority of US law as well. The ones I have to deal with are certainly much more vague than this. The conclusion is pure political theater, complete with an Orwellian reference to wrap it up (without ever explaining, of course, how not openly teaching racism in the classroom is a great curb of free speech but other education laws are not).
I did skim read the questions of standing, which aren't really applicable to the subject.
I am still no closer to being able to find what specifically is objectionable in this bill, unless we argue that all education bills are objectionable because what is taught should not be dictated to the teacher and should not be chosen by the state. Which is a pretty far right decision. If we are fine with all other (or most) such bills though - how is this one different and objectionable? Nobody can ever answer this question without using political statements and op-eds filled with falsehoods that have nothing to do with the actual law.
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