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#11
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Quote:
Yes, the fourth link was making the same argument I was making. I guess they were all making it up. Don't have time to read Paul Bogdanor's tome. I'm guess it corroborates everything you're saying. Regarding the Yaffa article and quote, takeaways aren't always accurate. Nice nitpicking of Mearsheimer. Regardless of all this, what people like Kennan and McNamara were saying in the 90s is coming to pass. NATO began expansion when Russia was in chaos, struggling politically and economically. Putin has been talking about Ukraine for years. The U.S. refusal to engage him and take his concerns seriously played a pivotal role in the present crisis. Proving beyond a shadow of a doubt that promises were or weren't made ultimately isn't the issue. What is central, and was of concern to scholars like Cohen and the others mentioned earlier is how Russia would react to the encroachment of NATO on it's borders. Their concerns apparently were well-founded. I guess if Putin had talked to you, he never would have been concerned about Ukraine joining NATO. Troops stationed in bordering countries whose sole purpose is to engage you militarily, and missiles pointed at you aren't dangerous if someone didn't promise you that they wouldn't put them there. And the U.S. was correct in ignoring Putin's concerns despite his repeated statements and warnings, because they had never made that promise. Anyway, you can have the last word! I'm here for the baseball cards. Have a good one. |
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